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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 14-1812 
________________ 
 
DAVID CROCKETT, 
        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, 
d/b/a SEPTA; PASQUALE T. DEON, SR., in his individual capacity; 
JACK K. LEARY, in his individual capacity; 
FAYE MOORE, in her individual capacity; 
JOSEPH M. CASEY, in his individual capacity; 
LUTHER DIGGS, in his individual capacity; 
PAT NOWAKOWSKI, in his individual capacity; 
BERNARD COHEN, in his individual capacity; 
JEFFREY KNUPPEL, in his individual capacity; 
JAMES B. JORDAN, in his individual capacity; 
NICHOLAS J. STAFFIERI, in his individual capacity 
 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-12-cv-04230) 
District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 12, 2015 
 
Before: AMBRO, FUENTES, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January  30, 2015) 
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________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 David Crockett appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his due-process claim 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority 
(“SEPTA”) and ten individual defendants.  Because Crockett has failed to allege that his 
harm stemmed from any affirmative act (as opposed to passive inaction), we affirm.  
I. 
On September 1, 2010, a trap door on Crockett’s SEPTA train “sprang forward, 
striking [him] on his right leg and slam[ing] down on his left foot.”  Crockett alleges that 
the incident can be traced to a mechanical defect that SEPTA has known about since the 
1980s yet has failed to fix.  He subsequently filed a putative class action in the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on behalf of himself and all other 
passengers riding on his train that day.  Specifically, he brought negligence claims 
against SEPTA, and he brought a § 1983 due-process claim against SEPTA and the 
individual defendants based on a state-created danger theory of liability. 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss Crockett’s § 1983 claim under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing, among other things, that Crockett failed to 
allege adequately the elements of a state-created danger claim.  The District Court 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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granted the motion, leaving only Crockett’s state-law tort claims.  The parties 
subsequently settled these claims with an agreement that Crockett could appeal the 
District Court’s dismissal of his § 1983 claim.  This appeal followed.  
II. 
Our review of a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) is plenary.  Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 
159, 163 (3d Cir. 2010).  “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only 
if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds that plaintiff’s claims lack facial 
plausibility.”  Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011).  In 
undertaking that inquiry, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party.  Heightened Independence & Progress, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 
693 F.3d 345, 351 (3d Cir. 2012). 
III. 
Reading the facts in the light most favorable to Crockett, we agree with the 
District Court that he has not pled a plausible due-process claim under a state-created 
danger theory.  This doctrine, which is an exception to the general rule that a state is not 
required to protect citizens from harm, only applies when state actors acted affirmatively 
either to expose a plaintiff to danger or to render him more vulnerable to harm.  Bright v. 
Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2006).  Crockett’s claim fails because he 
has not alleged that his harm stems from any affirmative act.  
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Our decision in Searles v. SEPTA, 990 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1993), is directly on 
point.  There we held that the plaintiff’s allegations “that [the] defendants failed to secure 
the motor properly” on a SEPTA train, “and also failed to discover the alleged dangerous 
condition despite numerous purported maintenance inspections,” could not proceed under 
the state-created danger theory of liability because “the fundamental cause of danger was 
a failure to act.”  Id. at 793 (emphasis added).  Likewise, while Crockett contends state 
officials acted by forgoing daily inspections, passive inertia, resulting in nothing being 
done, falls short of an “affirmative act in the traditional sense.”  Id.  That Crockett 
attempts to “restat[e] the [d]efendants’ inaction as an affirmative failure to act does not 
alter the passive nature of the alleged conduct.”  Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 179 
(3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 824 (2013). 
* * * 
 Because we conclude that Crockett failed to allege that defendants took any 
affirmative act to place him in danger, we need not reach the District Court’s alternative 
grounds for dismissing Crockett’s § 1983 claim.  We thus affirm.  
 
